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In the Supren1e Court of the 
State of Utah 
) DELBERT M. YERGENSE.N, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
I 
vs. \ CASE 
EMMETT D. FORlD, ·and N. E. FERGUSON, 
dba FORD AND FERGUSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NO. 10198 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
·Respondent adopts appellant's statement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent adopts appellant's statement. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent adopts appellant's statement. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is substantially correct. 
Respondent would add, ·however, that the recoro indicates 
service of process oniy upon defendant Emmett D. Ford, 
and the entire action, including this appeal, pertains only 
to this defendant personally. 
Respondent would also add that the compromise agree-
ment entered into on April 18, 1950, (Tr. 4-6) was an agree-
ment by defendant Emmett D·. Ford to pay ornly a portion 
of the judgment, and that the origilnal judgment was en-
tered on September 7, 1949. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
AN ACTION BASED ON A PRIOR JUDGMENT, 
WinCH IS COMMENCED MOIRE THAN EIGHT (8) 
~EARS AFTER ENTRY Q;F THE PRIOR JUDGlY.IENT, 
IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
POINT n 
THE STATUTE O·F LIMITATIONS AS IT PER-
TAINS TO· AN ACTION BASED ON A PRIOR JUDG-
MENT, IS NOT T01LLED BY AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
OF, Q~R PAYMENTS O·N, SAID JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN ACTIOIN BASED ON A PRIOR JUDGMENT, 
WinCH IS CO'l\fl\1ENCEID MORE THAN EIGIIT (8) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
YEARS AFTER ENTRY O~F THE PRI,O·R JUDGME:NT, 
IS BARRED BY THE S~ATUTE O·F LIMITATIO·NS. 
".Dhe present action, to renew a judgment was com-
menced on February 5, 1958. This was almost 8 yeaifls 
and 5 months from the date of entry of the original judg-
ment (September 7, 1949). The pertinent Utah Statute 
is as folllows: 
78-12-22 "Within eight years: an action upon a judg-
ment or decree of any Court otf the United States or of 
any state or territory within the United States." 
The conclusiveness of this statute is supplemented by 
other statutory provisions. 
Ru1e 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, proiVides in 
part as follows: 
"(a) Process to enforce a judgment shall be by a writ 
of execution unless the court otherwise directs, which 
may issue at any tim·e within eight years after the 
entry of judgment . '' 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Title 78-22-1, Urtah Oode Annotated, 1953, referring 
to judgment liens again~st real property, concludes as fol-
lows: 
"The lien shall continue for eight years unless the judg-
. ment is previously satisfied oro unless the enforcement 
of the judgment is stayed on appeal lby the execution 
of a sufficient undertaking as provided by law, in 
which case the lien of the judgment ·ceases.'' 
(Emphasis ours) 
Also, in Youngdale v. Burton, 102 Utah 169, 128 P2d 
1053, a case somewhat similar to the case at bar, the issue 
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before the court was whether a writ of -execution, based 
on a prior judgment could issue after the expiration of 
eight years ~rom entry of the judgment. The court said: 
"A money judgment :f1orn1s the basis for but two legal 
proceedings.: (a) A suit thereon, brought within eight 
years, wherein it forms the basis or chose in action 
for a new judgment, or (b) Some form of proceed-
ings in execution for collection. Subdivision (a) is 
disposed o[ by Section 104-2-21, the eight-year statute 
~ l" "t t" , O.L Ull.l a lOtn.S. 
POINT II 
THE ,STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS IT PER-
TAINS TO AN ACTION BASED ON A PRIOR JUDG-
MENT, IS NOT TOLLBD BY AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
OF, O~R PAYMENTS O·N, SAID JUDGMENT . 
. Appellant contends that an acknowledgment of, or 
payment on a _prior. judgment, should have the effect of 
tolling the statute of limitations, so that a new action, 
based on the judgment, might properly be filed within 
eight . years .. &fter ~uch acknowledgment or payment. In 
this ~connection, appellant cites Title 78-1244, Utah Code 
Annotated, 19·53-, which provides that in a case founded 
on .ccnt:ract, the statute of limitations may be tolled by 
payment or acknowledgment, and urges that a "judgment" 
is a "contract" and the·refore subject to the provisions of 
this statute. 
With ·respect to the applioobility of a statute of this 
kind to judgments, the following language points out the 
general problem and its solution in the courts of various 
states: 
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"With respect to judgments, in each instance the de-
cisions seem to turn upon the determination of the 
question whether the obligation is a contract. Thus, 
in some jurisdictions, on the theocy that a judgment 
is a contract, it is held that a part payment on a judg-
ment has the same effect to interrupt the running of 
the statute as it does in the case of other contractual 
obligations. In other jurisdictions, it is held that a 
judgment is not a contract within the meaning of 
limitations statutes and that an action thereon is not 
ex 10ontractu. Decisions, therefore, which adhere to 
this doctrine 1hold that a part-payment of a judgment 
does nort: remo~e the bar of the statute or mise a new 
promise, such as will start it running anew. In these 
jurisdictions, it is held that a cause of action becomes 
merged in the judgment rendered in an action to re-
cover thereon, and upon the entry of the judgment, 
becomes -changed in form and its original character 
wholly extinguished." (34 Am. Jur., Limitation of 
A;ctions, p. 264, Sec. 335) 
Since the statutes involved seem to be the controlling 
factor, an analysis of the pertinent Utah statutes should 
be hetpful: 
The Utah statute referred to herein (78-12-44) was 
originally enacted in 1872. It has not been changed Ol' 
amended sin:ce its original passage. This section was taken 
verbatim from K·ansas, it being originally enacted by that 
8tate as Kansas General Statutes, 1868, Page 634, Section 
24 (O'Donnell v. Parker, 160 Pac. 1192, Utah). This statute 
has likewise never been changed or amended by the Srtate 
of Kansas since its original enactment. 
It is significant to note that Kansas is among those 
states in whi~ch it has been held that an acknowledgment 
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of a judgment or a partial payment theTeon does not op-
erate to start the statute running anew from the time of 
the acknowledgment or payment. (Harper v. Daniels, 
1914,_ CA 8th Kan., 211 Fed. 57; Sharp v. Sharp 1941, 154 
K;an. 175, 117 P2d 561). In the case of Sharp v. Sharp, 
Supra, the Kansas. Court ve~ry carefully analyzes a statute 
identical to our Title 78-12-44, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether a judgment can be interpreted as being 
a "contract" within the meaning of that sta·tute. The 
Court concluded that a judgment \Vas nort a contract with-
in the meaning. of that statute, and held that part payment 
made on a prior judgment did nort' toll the statute of limi-
tations on a subsequent suit based on that prior judgment. 
Our present Section 78:..12-44 is the result of the repeal 
of. the f,ormer section and. the passing of a new statute in 
1951. The newly enacted statute was identical with the 
fiormer one. Had there been any legislative intent to ex-
tend the period of limitation on a judgment by the mak-
1ng of part payments, or by the written acknowledgment 
of the debt, or ·by court authority, such intent would have 
been voiced hy the legislature at that time. The fact that 
the legislature, has been silent on tllis question since the 
original enactment of this statute in 1872 would appear 
to indicate an intention on the part of the legislature that 
the- word "-contract" in the statute not be interpreted to 
mean "judgment". 
Such an implication of legislative intent was reached 
by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in La Salle Extension 
University v. Barr (1941) 19· NJ Misc. 387, 20 A2d 609. 
In that case, an action was filed· based on a prior judgment. 
The statute of limitations in New Jersey for such actions 
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is 20 years, and the case was filed more t!han 20 years 
after the original judgment had been entered. In review-
ing the statute the court says: 
"In New Jersey on the other hand, the statute makes 
no provision that payment or acknorwledgement of an 
indebtedness within 20 years shall be exception to the 
presumption of payment after 20 years. 
The fact\~that the New Jersey statute by implica-
tion seems to say exactly the opposite"Q>y nort men-
tioning any means by which the limitations on a judg-
ment might be tolled in a statutory section following 
immediately upon one providing that the statute run-
ning upon certain contracts might be tolled by pay-
ment made thereon within the period of limitation.) 
As stated by appellant, there is a division of authority 
in the cases which have been decided on this podnt of law. 
However, the better reasoned cases support respondent's 
contention herein. 
In La Salle Extension University v. Barr, Supra, the 
court, in discussing this conflict in decisions states: 
"The conflict in the decisions as to whether the run-
ning of the statute of limitations is suspended in the 
case of judgments by payments on account thereof, 
is due to the difference of opinion as to whe1Jher a 
judgment is a contract within the rule that payment 
on account of a contract tolls the statute. The better 
reasoned cases seem to be those holding that a judg-
ment is not a contract.'' 
The court's decision in that case, as stated above, was 
that a part payment on a judgment did not toll the statute. 
In the case of Giordano v. Wolcott, 134 A2d 593, N.J., 
the New Jersey Court in a reoent decision (1957) affirms 
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the holding. of the La Salle E,xtension University case, stat-
ing: 
"Moreove:r, the result accords with the salutary policy 
of suppressing the effect of matter dehors the record 
purporting to extend the life of a judgment which 
would appear dead to one consulting the record in the 
course of a title examination. We are not persuaded 
by decisions in other jurisdictions giving a different 
effect to statutes they are construing." 
In the case of Mutual Trust & D·eposit Company v. 
Boone, 267 SW 2d 751, (Ky. 1954,) the Kentucky Supreme 
Court affirmed a decision of the lower court that the stat-
utory period of limitations on a judgment is nort extended 
by the judgment debtor's promise to pay the judgment. 
In that case, the corurt carefully reviewed the historical 
development of the statutes of limitation and the statutory 
provision for the tolling of the statute of limitations on con-
tractual obligation by part payment o~ a new promise to 
pay. The corurt concludes as follows: 
"We also norte that in the Re-Statement of the Law of 
Contracts, Volume I, Section 86, it is stated that a 
promise to pay a debt created by contract otheT than 
a judgment is binding. The exclusion ofA judgments 
from the r~statement of the rule as to contracts be-
comes significant when it is noted that in the Re-State-
ment of the Law of Judgments there is no reference 
to renewal of a judgment by a promise to pay. 
Since we have found no Kentucky ~case which has gone 
so far as to 'hold that a promise to pay a judgment 
tolled the running of the statute of limitations, and 
since our examination of the general authorities has 
not convinced us that the Kentucky rules should be 
extended, we are of the opinion that the trial judge 
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properly held that a promise to pay the judgment in 
this case did not extend the statutory period of limi-
tation.'' 
Some of the foregoing cases have analyzed in great 
detail the question of whether a judgment constitutes a 
contract. In addition to the analyses of these various courts, 
we wish to add our own comment that a contract is ordi-
narily not a matter of public record, and the tolling of the 
statute of limitations .as provided in 78-12-44 would appear 
to.: have no significant effect except upon the parties to 
the .~tract. A judgment, on the orther hand, is a pub·lic 
record; not only in the county in which it is originally en-
tered, but in any county where it might subsequently be 
docketed. It becomes a lien upon all the real property of 
the judgment debtor in the county where it is originally en-
tered ·and in any subsequent county where it is docketed. 
The official record of such judgment is relied upon by 
members of the Bar, by abstractors and by title insurance 
companies to determine whether any judgment liens on 
real property are in effect. A holding that part- payments 
or promises to pay have the effect of tolling the eight-year 
statute of limitations would create a dilemma with respect 
to the validity of titles to real property, inasmuch as events 
entirely outside the official record would have a substantial 
effect on the validity of a judgment lien. 
It is axiomatic that a judgment is not enhanced or 
made ·stronger by payment or a promise to pay. A pay-
ment or promise to pay cannot change the charactm- or 
enforcealblity of the judgment. W'hy, the111, should they 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10. 
change the appUcable statute of limitations, as contended 
by appellant? 
But, even if we accept appellant's contention that such 
chan:ge is brought about by a payment orr pro!llNse to pay, 
this case is cleaTly distinguishable from the cases cited by 
appeUant, because in this case the agreement, and subse~­
quenrt payments, were not based on a payment of the 
judgment, but of a compromise amount, presumably ar-
rived at by negotiation between the parties. Thus, in ef-
fect, appellant abandoned the judgment in favor of a writ-
ten agre,emenrt. Yet, more than eight years later, he seeks 
by this action to resurrect that judgment. Ample reme-
dies fior the enforcement of the judgment were availalble 
to :him, including the filing of the ~present action prior to 
September 7, 1957. He availed himself of none of those 
remedies after 1951, and he should not now be allowed 
to breathe new life into a dead judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that the clear intent of the Utah 
Legislature, as evidenced by the statutes in podnt, is that 
an action based on a prior judgment must be commenced 
within eight years from entry thereof. There is no Utah 
case authority to the contrary. The better reasoned cases 
from other jurisdictions hold that the Statute of Limita-
tions pertaining to judgments is not tolled by payments or 
promises to pay. A serious dilemma as respects titles to 
real property would result if the contentions of appellant 
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were upheld. Based on the facts and the law, respondent 
W'ges that the decision of rthe trialeourt be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FORD R. PAULSON, for 
CHRISTENSEN, PAULSON & TAYLO'R 
Attorneys faT Defendant and 
Respondent 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
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